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Abstract - This paper analyses data from the 6
th sweep of National Child Development 
Study to investigate the labour market perspective of convicted individuals. Decomposition 
analysis makes it clear that convicted workers are actually discriminated against both in 
terms of employment and wage with respect to non-convicted. Adopting a simple 
theoretical model accounting for partial adverse selection problem in the hiring process, I 
show that discrimination is not only explained in terms of economic stigma but also may 
derive from the inefficiency of the police/justice system in detecting crime and punishing 
offenders. In fact, while firms may apply economic stigma to recover the expected extra-
costs from hiring convicted workers, firms rationality may impose to charge on convicted 
workers also unobservable expected extra-costs deriving from offenders non-convicted 
hired. The resulting over-stigma is increasing with the probability of offending and with 
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The interest of economists on the relation between crime and labour market 
performance has strongly increased in the last decades, as the number of 
individuals involved in crime has risen (Freeman, 1999). As Holzer (2007) 
reviewed, most of the empirical evidence shows that criminal record or being 
sanctioned by the justice system produces negative effects in terms of future 
employment and earnings. More recently, contradictory results have emerged 
among studies that stresses the role of pre-existing heterogeneity in sorting 
individuals both into criminal activities and poor labour market performance. 
On the one side, Waldfagel (1994) finds negative effects increasing with the 
number of convictions and Grogger (1995) finds that they are moderate in 
magnitude and short-living. On the other side, Nagin and Waldfagel (1995) 
finds that conviction, favouring the exit from low paying apprentice scheme in 
pursuit of more profitable activities, increases wages in the short-term but 
reduces chances for advancement in the future. Cho and LaLonde (2005) and 
Kling (2006) find slightly positive short-term effects and negligible medium-
term effects, respectively for specific groups of incarcerated women and 
among men who have spent time at work during incarceration. Poor labour 
market performance of individuals with criminal records may be explained in 
terms of both sides of the labour market. From a supply side point of view, 
according to the timing (childhood, adolescence or adulthood) of criminal 
records, crime may be associated with lower educational attainments and/or 
skills depreciation (Myers, 1983). The resulting lower productivity affects 
wage and possibly the range of employment opportunities. From a demand 
side point of view, stigmatization of offenders is believed to be one of the 
major source of their poor labour market performances. Finn and Fontaine 
(1985), show that employers are reluctant to hire offenders above all in case of 
violence against persons. Other economists measured the amount of stigma 
(for example Lott 1990, Waldfagel 1994, and Grogger 1995), while Rasmusen 
(1996) have tried to explain it from an economic point of view. 
This paper contributes to this stream of literature adopting a 
discrimination approach to analyze the structure, the magnitude and the 
sources of the offenders’ disadvantage on the labour market in terms of 
employment and wage. Discrimination may be seen as the valuation in the 
labour market of workers’ characteristics unrelated to worker productivity and 
it is a cause of labour market failure and a source of income inequality. Apart 
from social prejudice, discrimination may occur because some groups of 
                                                 
1 This paper was largely written during my research visit period (August-September 2009) at 
the Centre for Criminal Justice Economics and Psychology (University of York, UK), that I 
wish to thank for its support and hospitality. I am also indebted to Prof. Roger Bowles for 
useful discussions and to the participants at the V SIDE-ISLE Conference, Florence December 
2009, for their suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.   2
workers are suspected to possess unobservable characteristics negatively 
affecting productivity
2 or implying extra-costs for employers. From an 
empirical point of view, discrimination corresponds to a returns’ penalty,   
given some characteristics, worsening labour market outcomes. There are 
various reasons to focus on discrimination against offenders. First, while 
labour market discrimination has been studied with respect to many groups 
(gender, race, age, religion and so on), it has received scarce attention with 
respect to offenders. Second, discrimination analysis may provide an actual 
measure of the disadvantage on the labour market of offenders, once the 
characteristics effect (including productivity differential) is controlled for. 
Finally, by adopting a simple theoretical framework modelling the adverse 
selection in the hiring process and accounting for the expected extra-costs 
from hiring offenders, it is possible to explain the poor labour market 
performances of offenders from an economic perspective rather than a 
prejudice perspective. Specifically, I show that the total amount of empirical 
discrimination against offenders, i.e. their actual disadvantage, is not 
composed only by stigma but also by what I call “over-stigma” deriving from 
the inefficiency of the police/justice system in detecting crime and punishing 
offenders (henceforth inefficient police/justice system). On the one side, 
employers may suspect that hiring offenders involves future extra-costs 
because of their  higher probability of re-offending
3 (Entorf, 2009). This is per 
se a direct source of economic stigma involving penalties for offenders on the 
labour market. On the other side, as Rasmusen (1996) implicitly argued, an 
economy populated by offenders and non-offenders, and with an inefficient 
police/justice system, is characterized by an asymmetric information problem 
in the hiring process. In fact, since conviction is the only signal for employers 
to recognize offenders, and given the inefficiency of the police/justice system, 
only convicted offenders are recognizable as offenders while non-convicted 
offenders, and their expected extra-costs, remain unrecognizable. In this case, 
if firms recover expected extra-costs from unobservable offenders and act 
rationally, they should load these extra-costs on convicted individuals 
determining another source of their poor labour market performance. 
Obviously, this has implication in terms of wage inequality. Moreover, the 
existence of over-stigma has implications in terms of offending decisions in 
the context of dynamic offending frameworks (for an application see Bowles 
and Florackis, 2006), since it should be taken into account by individuals as a 
source of future loss in case of criminal activities.  
Discrimination analysis is carried out by applying the standard Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition technique and its extensions. It allows to decompose 
                                                 
2 Bushway (1998 and 2004) and Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2006) apply discrimination thesis 
to crime and labour market literature to explain the poor labour market performance of ethnic 
groups (black people) in presence of limited access to criminal archives to identify criminals. 
3 Re-offence may determine both direct and indirect extra-costs. Direct extra-costs may arise 
in the form of theft, fraud, injury to co-workers and so on. Indirect extra-costs  may arise in 
the form of new search and training costs for employers in case re-offender is dismissed.    3
the raw employment and wage differential determined by recognizable 
criminal activities between endowment effect (productivity differential) and 
coefficient effect that represents the valuation of workers’ characteristics 
unrelated to worker productivity (stigma plus over-stigma). Specific 
econometric techniques is applied to correct estimates for selection bias and 
endogeneity problems, possibly determined by the most likely association 
between some labour market outcomes and criminal activities. Moreover, even 
thought cross-sectional data does not allow to correct estimates for pre-
existing heterogeneity, the presence and the relevance of unobservable 
heterogeneity is tested and presented in the appendix. 
The analysis is based on cross-sectional data from the 6
th sweep (1999-
2000) of the National Child Development Study (NCDS). The 6
th sweep 
collects a large number of idiosyncratic, familiar and job related information 
on over 11000 individuals of the original cohort, and it is the only one 
including questions about conviction records in the time span since the last 
survey (1991), allowing us to identify convicted and non-convicted 
individuals.  
Empirical results show that convicted individuals are less likely to be 
employed than non-convicted, while display higher observed wage. However 
wage decomposition makes it clear that discrimination is working and 
convicted workers are actually moderately penalized in terms of wage, while 
observed higher wages derives from segmentation of convicted with poor 
characteristics into self-employment, unemployment and inactivity. Finally, by 
combination of theoretical predictions and evidence of employment and wage 
discrimination suggests that firms expect extra-costs from hiring offenders 
justifying economic stigma. Moreover, in case of inefficiency of the 
police/justice system, the labour market performances of convicted individuals 
may worsen since discrimination against raises to include over-stigma 
determined by the loading of unobservable extra-costs.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple 
theoretical model, while section 3 presents the econometric specification. 




2. Inefficiency of the police/justice system and discrimination 
This section presents a simple framework to model the effect on firms’ labour 
costs of imperfect identification of offenders and discusses possible 
implications in terms of wage and employment discrimination. The 
identification of offenders is an important issue for firms, since hiring 
offenders may determine extra-costs due to their higher probability of re-
offending. I assume that, since firms are aware of the risk of incurring in extra-
costs, they may apply a discount rate on employment and wage (respectively g 
and  d) to offenders to recover extra-costs. This is economic stigma and 
descends from a moral hazard problem. Without loss of generality for the   4
model predictions I make two assumptions to simplify the framework. First, I 
do not account for moral hazard assuming that extra-costs certainly arise. 
Second, the expected lower productivity of offenders is not modelled, since its 
effect on labour market outcomes concerns the endowment effect and not the 
coefficient effect measuring discrimination. I also assume that the only 
instrument that firms have to identify offenders is the observation of a criminal 
conviction, as similarly argued by Nagin and Waldfagel (1999). However, 
since the probability of conviction for offenders (π) is less than one, firms only 
have weak instrument for identification. This implies a partial adverse 
selection problem in the hiring process deriving from the inefficiency of the 
police/justice system, and it is the source of over-stigma. 
 
2.1 Wage 
Let us indicate by x the optimal wage paid to workers according to their 
productivity given their observable characteristics (we refer also to x as the 
fair wage). The optimal wage policy for firms provides a discount for the 
extra-costs of the wage paid to offenders, so the labour cost of employing an 
offender is x-d. So, d is the measure of the economic stigma to recover the 
future extra-costs deriving from hiring offenders. Let us assume that the 
proportion of the offending population is γ and that the economy is 
characterized by a fully efficient police/justice system, i.e. the probability of 
conviction is 1. In this case all offenders may be indentified and firms may 
discount the wage to allow for the future losses from re-offending. The 
standardized optimal labour cost paid by firms in an efficient system (ES) is: 
 
()( ) d x x wES − + − = γ γ 1         ( 1 )  
 
However if the probability of conviction of offenders is less than 1 then only a 
part of offenders are observable (γπ), while the remaining (γ(1-π)) are 
unobservable and firms consider them as non-offenders (partial adverse 
selection). The standardized optimal labour cost paid in an inefficient system 
(IS) is now: 
 
() ( ) ( )x d x x wIS π γ γπ γ − + − + − = 1 1       ( 2 )  
 
Since wIS > wES and if firms pay their own employees the fair wage, the 
inefficiency of the police/justice system results in a profit loss for firms (cost 
of the inefficiency). The cost of the inefficiency in terms of wage is: 
 
() π γ − = − = 1 d wES wIS CIw        ( 3 )  
 
i.e. CIw is increasing in the future extra-costs, and in the proportion of the 
population offending, while it is decreasing in the probability of convicting 
offenders. It represents the part of discrimination due to unobservable   5
offenders. High values of γ and low values of π are associated with high CI, 
since both increase the probability of facing unobservable extra-costs.  
 
2.2 Employment  
An identical approach is used to model the cost of inefficiency in terms of 
employment. The standardized workforce in an efficient system is:  
 
() () g eES − + − = 1 1 γ γ         ( 4 )  
 
Where g represents the discount on employment to recover the future extra-
costs of offenders (economic stigma). It implies that the level of employment 
is lower with respect to a labour market without offenders. As before, g may 
be thought as the coefficients effect in the context of employment differential, 
while the discount due to worse job related characteristics of convicted 
individuals represents the endowments effect. The standardized workforce in 
an inefficient system is:  
 
()() () π γ γπ γ − + − + − = 1 1 1 g eIS        ( 5 )  
 
Since  eIS > eES, if firms hire workers according to their observable 
characteristics, then the inefficiency of the system determines a surplus of 
employment with respect to the optimal level (cost of inefficiency). The cost 
of inefficiency in terms of employment is: 
 
() π γ − = − = 1 g eES eIS CIe         ( 6 )  
 
Conclusions equivalent to the previous ones may be drawn about the 
relationship between the cost of inefficiency and explanatory variables.  
 
2.3 The loading of unobservable extra-costs 
The model predicts that because of partial adverse selection, firms may find 
themselves in sub-optimal solutions both in terms of wage and employment. 
Rational behaviour of firms provides for loading the cost of inefficiency on 
employees, reducing their employment and/or wage through a reduction of 
characteristics’ returns (discrimination due to unobservable extra-costs). This 
reduction is added to that applied to convicted individuals to recover 
observable extra-costs. Which group of workers (convicted or non-convicted) 
will be charged this further penalty? Here we argue that if firms act rationally 
it is likely that the cost deriving from partial adverse selection is charged on 
convicted individuals, determining a worsening of their labour market 
perspective (over-stigma). From an employment point of view, for firms it 
should be more efficient to discriminate against convicted individuals. On the 
one side, they are likely to be less productive while discriminating against 
non-convicted individuals may imply a relatively greater loss in production   6
level. On the other side, convicted individuals may involve greater extra-costs 
per capita. From a wage point of view, discrimination against convicted 
individuals is more likely since, for example, they should be more prone to 
accept lower wages to work, or because of their lower bargaining power. 
Finally, the decision of applying both employment and wage discrimination 
may be dictated by rational constraints with respect to the hiring decisions of 
firms and, above all, job-search behaviour of employees. For instance, if firms 
decide to apply only wage discrimination, and the actual wage offered to 
convicted workers is lower than their reservation wages, then firms would not 
recover the cost of inefficiency, since no convicted would be employed. To 
avoid this risk, firms can choose to recover the cost of inefficiency sharing it 
between wage and employment discrimination. 
 
2.4 Structure of wage differential 
From the above, it is possible to infer the structure of the employment and 
wage differential between convicted and non-convicted people. Let us 
consider just the structure of the wage differential, since the structure of the 
employment differential is very close. The first term, h, represents the 
endowment effect, i.e. the wage differential due to differences in 
characteristics, and include the differences in productivity level
4. The second 
term, d, represents the wage differential due to the reduction of returns to 
characteristics of convicted individual to recover the observable future extra-
costs. The third term, d(1-π)/π, represents the wage differential due to the 
reduction of returns to characteristics of convicted individual to recover the 
unobservable future extra-costs. It corresponds to the quota of the cost of 
inefficiency paid by each convicted individual hired. The sum of the second 
and the third term represents the wage discrimination, i.e. the wage differential 
determined by returns’ penalty. The sum of the first two terms may be seen as 
the disadvantage that convicted individuals expect to face in the labour 
market, while the third term is the so-called over-stigma and strictly depends 
on the inefficiency of the police/justice system. It represents an unexpected 
disadvantage in the labour market for convicted individuals. 








Raw differential  
 
According to the previous consideration, if empirical evidence confirms the 
existence of discrimination against convicted individuals, it would be a 
support for three main points. First, extra-costs exist. Second, firms are 
                                                 
4 The first term also includes wage differential not directly related with productivity. For 
example, specific local market effect or firm size effect and so on.   7
informed of their existence and operate to absorb them. Third, and more 
importantly, the inefficiency of the police/justice system is a further source of 
poor labour market performance for convicted individuals (over-stigma), that 
is added to the wage differential due to their suspected lower productivity and 
to the future extra-costs that are suspected to be involved (stigma effect). 
 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
This study aims at investigating the existence of discrimination against 
workers who have conviction records in terms of employment and wage. 
Discrimination analysis requires estimating employment and wage equations 
both for convicted workers (C) and non-convicted workers (NC), and applying 
the decomposition technique due to Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). A 
generalization for non-linear outcomes (Fairlie, 2005) is applied to investigate 
employment discrimination.  
Since we are interested in studying discrimination in the sphere of the 
relationship between conviction and the probability of being hired by 
employers, the self-employment condition is not investigated and the self-
employed are included in the not employed group along with the unemployed 
and inactive. 
A static employment equation for each group k (k = C, NC) is estimated. For 
each group it reads: 
 
[] 0 1 ≥ + = ik ik k ik X e ε β         ( 7 )  
 
where e is a binary variable indicating whether the individual i is employed in 
the year 2000, X is a vector of individual, familiar and job related 
characteristics, β is a set of parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term. 
If the distribution is symmetric then: 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ik k ik ik k ik ik ik ik ik X F X X X e X e β β ε = − ≤ = ≥ = = | Pr | 0 Pr | 1 Pr  (8) 
 
if we assume that the error term has a standard normal distribution we obtain a 
probit model, hence the probability of employment reads: 
 
() ( ) ik k ik ik X X e β Φ = = | 1 P r         ( 9 )  
 
The probit model is usually estimated by maximum likelihood estimation and 
the log likelihood for a sample of independent observations may be written as: 
 
( ) () ( ) () [] ∑ ∑
= =






i X F e X F e L
1 1
1 log 1 log log β β β     (10) 
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The decomposition for the non-linear equation, following Fairlie (2005) may 
be written as: 
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To uncover the existence of wage discrimination against convicted workers we 




ik ik k ik k ik u S Z w + + = ξ α         ( 1 2 )  
 
where w is the log of the hourly wage, Z is a vector of individual, familiar and 
job related characteristics, S is the educational variable, α is a vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated, ξ is the educational level parameter and 
u is the spherical disturbance. Generally, since the probability of observing 
wage depends on the selection into employment rather than on the other 
possible economic status due to specific individual characteristics, wage 
equations are usually corrected by introducing a selection term to obtain 
consistent estimates. This appears particularly relevant in our case, since 
convicted workers are more likely to experience selection into inactivity, 
unemployment or self-employment as a result both of stigma and/or 
discouragement or self-selection. To estimate a selection-corrected wage 
equation a Heckman selection model (1979) is applied. Therefore, in the first 
step we run the previous employment equation to estimate the probability of 
selecting into employment and to calculate the Inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), 
while in the second step a wage equation including the selection term is 




   
ik k
ik k







=         ( 1 3 )  
 
where φ and Φ denote, respectively, the probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions of the standard normal distribution. In the second step 
wage equations including the selection term are estimated. Therefore, the 
Heckman selection model we estimate is: 
 
[ ] [ ]   |
~ ~ 1 , ,
~
| ik k ik ik ik k ik k ik ik ik ik X u E S Z e S Z w E β ε ξ α − > + + = =    (14) 
 
and the selection corrected wage equation, or the conditional wage equation, 
reads: 
 
   ˆ ~ ~
ik ik k ik k ik k ik v S Z w + + + = λ δ ξ α        ( 1 5 )    9
where the error terms are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution 
with means zero and variances 1 for the selection equation and σu for the wage 
equation, and ρ is the correlation coefficient and lambda the inverse mills 
ratio. 
Another typical problem arising in cross-sectional data models is the 
endogeneity of covariates that occur when they are correlated with the 
disturbances due to, for example, omitted variables or measurement error. If a 
covariate is endogenous, then the orthogonality assumption is violated and 
ordinary least squares estimates are not consistent. Since endogeneity tests 
reveal that the educational variable is endogenous, at least in the wage 
equation of non-convicted people, we apply a two stage least squares 
regression model (2SLS). The educational level is instrumented by a set of 
variables available from the NCDS1, NCDS2 and NCDS3, that should be 
correlated with the instrumented variable and not correlated with the 
disturbances. Specifically, we use a variable indicating the presence of 
problems (death of one of parents, unemployment, financial problems, 
separation/divorce, family conflicts, domestic tension) in the family of origin 
of the individual when he/she was 7 years old, two variables indicating the 
attention of fathers and mothers for the education of their children when 
he/she was 11 years old, variables indicating the parents’ expectations about 
the maximum education level that the children would have reached at age 16, 
a dummy indicating if the individual was suspended at least once from school. 
According to the 2SLS method, in the first stage the endogenous variable is 
estimated both on the exogenous variables of the wage equation and on the 
vector of instrumental variables (Qik): 
 
   ˆ ~ ~
ik ik k ik k ik k ik Q Z S η ϑ λ δ α + + + =        ( 1 6 )  
 
In the second stage the original selection corrected wage equation is estimated 
by including the instrumented educational level 
 
   ˆ ˆ ~ ~
ik ik k ik k ik k ik S Z w υ λ δ ξ α + + + =        ( 1 7 )  
 
where the spherical disturbance υik, is assumed to be uncorrelated with ηik . 
The presence of wage discrimination between the two groups is investigated 
by applying the Oaxaca (1973)-Blinder (1973) decomposition revisited by 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). Based on the conditional wage estimation, that 
decomposition reads: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
C C NC NC C NC C NC Z Z Z Z w w α α α α α ˆ ˆ




Where Z is the full set of covariates, including the educational variable, and α 
is the full set of estimated parameters. Finally:   10
( )
C NC I α α α ˆ ˆ
* Ω − + Ω =         ( 1 9 )  
 
is an approximation of the unobserved non discriminatory earnings structure, 
with I indicates an identity matrix and 
 
()
NC NC C C NC NC X X X X X X
' 1 ' ' −
+ = Ω      ( 2 0 )  
 





Econometric analysis is based on the information gathered by 6
th sweep of the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS) in the 1999-2000. The NCDS is a 
continuing longitudinal study that seeks to follow the lives of all those living 
in England, Scotland and Wales who were born in one particular week in 
1958. The main aim of the study is to improve the understanding of the factors 
affecting human development over the whole lifespan. The NCDS has its 
origin in the Perinatal Mortality Survey (PMS) that collected information on a 
cohort of about 17000 children. Successively, the PMS became the NCDS that 
has gathered information on the same individuals at different points in time 
(1965, 1969, 1974, 1981, 1991, 1999-2000 and 2004-2005). The 6
th NCDS 
sweep took place in 1999-2000, when cohort members were aged 41-42 years, 
providing a large set of information over 11000 of the original cohort 
individuals. Specifically, the dataset covers topics such as household, housing, 
relationships, children, family, social relationship and support, income, 
employment, lifelong learning, health, citizenship and values and, finally a 
self-completion part that includes information about drug use and contact with 




is also used in the context of endogeneity problems and to construct some 
variables used in the 6
th sweep analysis. The question “Been found guilty by a 
court since the reference date?” is used here to identify individuals with and 
without conviction records in the time span between 1991 and 1999. 
Information about economic status allows us to distinguish employed 
individuals from those who are self-employed, unemployed and out of the 
labour force. In this context, since self-employed are not subjected to 
economic stigma, they are simply considered as not employed. Finally 
information on net pay, the period covered and usual and overtime hours 
worked per week, allows us to construct the hourly wage variable
6. The 
                                                 
5 Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) proposed that the weighting matrix is a null matrix or an 
identity matrix. Reimers (1983) proposed that it is 0.5*I, while Cotton (1988) proposed that it 
corresponds to s*I where s denotes the relative sample-size of the majority group. 
6 Given that about 15% missing information on working hours, the imputation technique was 
implemented to avoid the loss of much information. The auxiliary regression used to impute 
missing data is available upon request.   11
resultant hourly wage variable was subjected to top and bottom coding at 1% 
to reduce bias from outliers, and for the same reason we excluded from our 
sample individuals (25 observations) declaring to work less than 7 hours per 
week or more than 84 hours per week. Because of missing information the 
sample used to estimate employment equation is composed of 10330 
individuals, of whom 441 have conviction histories, while the sample used to 
estimate the wage equation is composed of 7151 individuals, of whom 260 
have conviction records. Finally, a further restriction is made (5320 
individuals, of whom 191 have conviction records) with regard to the wage 
estimation by 2SLS because of missing data in the instrumental variables.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics both for the employment equation 
sample and for the wage equation sample.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Male 0.469 0.499 0.821 0.384 0.478 0.500 0.842 0.365
Educational level 2.571 1.491 2.331 1.478 2.636 1.480 2.515 1.482
Ethnic 0.014 0.118 0.025 0.156 0.014 0.116 0.031 0.173
Disability 0.018 0.134 0.023 0.149 0.013 0.115 0.023 0.150
Poor health 0.031 0.172 0.063 0.244 0.011 0.102 0.019 0.138
Drug use 0.320 0.467 0.531 0.500 0.300 0.458 0.462 0.499
Married 0.814 0.389 0.689 0.463 0.828 0.377 0.719 0.450
Children 0-6 0.196 0.397 0.179 0.384 - - - -
Permanent contract - - - - 0.952 0.214 0.958 0.202
Private sector - - - - 0.598 0.490 0.765 0.425
Manager/Professional - - - - 0.318 0.466 0.404 0.492
Non manual worker - - - - 0.173 0.378 0.092 0.290
Junior non manual - - - - 0.200 0.400 0.046 0.210
Skilled manual worker -- - - 0.146 0.353 0.292 0.456
Semi-skilled - - - - 0.067 0.250 0.085 0.279
Unskilled/Personal/Agricultural - - - - 0.095 0.293 0.077 0.267
Tenure -- - - 9.133 7.882 9.142 8.865
Number of unemployment spells 0.084 0.358 0.222 0.607 0.078 0.336 0.177 0.489
Firm size 0-9 - - - - 0.167 0.373 0.135 0.342
Firm size 10-24 - - - - 0.164 0.370 0.150 0.358
Firm size 25-99 - - - - 0.257 0.437 0.296 0.457
Firm size 100-499 - - - - 0.227 0.419 0.265 0.442
Firm size over 500 - - - - 0.185 0.388 0.154 0.361
Part-time job -- - - 0.234 0.423 0.065 0.248
Vocational 0.303 0.460 0.340 0.474 0.319 0.466 0.365 0.482
Union membership - - - - 0.374 0.484 0.362 0.481
Computer use 0.658 0.475 0.571 0.495 0.709 0.454 0.638 0.481
Ability learn new skills - - - - 0.549 0.498 0.619 0.487
Partner employed 0.694 0.461 0.531 0.500 - - - -
North-east 0.062 0.242 0.068 0.252 0.065 0.247 0.073 0.261
Yorkshire-The Humber 0.091 0.288 0.100 0.300 0.093 0.290 0.081 0.273
East midlands 0.074 0.262 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.268 0.100 0.301
East-anglia 0.041 0.199 0.041 0.198 0.041 0.198 0.035 0.183
South-east 0.297 0.457 0.297 0.457 0.288 0.453 0.281 0.450
South-west 0.097 0.296 0.082 0.274 0.092 0.289 0.088 0.285
West-midlands 0.088 0.283 0.093 0.291 0.092 0.290 0.092 0.290
North-west 0.106 0.307 0.084 0.278 0.109 0.312 0.096 0.295
Wales 0.053 0.225 0.052 0.223 0.050 0.218 0.038 0.193
Scotland 0.090 0.286 0.107 0.309 0.091 0.288 0.115 0.320
Observations
Employment equation Wage equation
NON-CONVICTED CONVICTED NON-CONVICTED CONVICTED
9889 441 6891 260  
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data   12
Variables used to control for observable heterogeneity include individual, 
familiar and job related characteristics. Specifically, the variability in the 
employment equation is controlled for gender, educational level (six levels 
ranging from no qualification to NVQ4/5), ethnic, disability status, poor health 
conditions, drug use (present or past), marriage status, presence of children 
aged 0-6 (including an interaction dummy to control for the different effect of 
children on fathers and mothers), the number of previous spells of 
unemployment to proxy the cumulated work experience, a dummy for 
individuals who received vocational training, ability in computer use, a 
dummy identifying the partner’s employment status, finally regional dummies 
are introduced to control for country-local specific effects (the South-east, 
including London, is the base-category). Wage equations variability is 
controlled for the same variables excluding the presence of children and the 
employment status of partner. Moreover, a set of job related characteristics are 
included to control for some specific source of individual wage heterogeneity. 
Specifically we include a dummy for individuals employed with a permanent 
contract, employed in private sector, dummies to control for profession 
(according to the socio-economic group definition), tenure, firm size, part-time 
employment, union membership and, finally, a dummy to control for ability in 
learning new skills (taking the value one if the individual has good ability) 
introduced to proxy the individual ability heterogeneity that is usually 
unobservable in many datasets. Table 2 shows the mean values of the 
employment rate and wage between individuals with and without convictions, 
as preliminary information about the effect of convictions on labour market 
outcomes.  
 
Table 2 Mean employment and wage 
Mean s.e. Mean s.e. t-test P-value
Employment 0.734 0.004 0.637 0.023 4.497 0.000
Wage 1.791 0.007 1.850 0.038 -1.537 0.124
NON-CONVICTED CONVICTED
 
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
The observed employment rate is higher for individuals without convictions 
than among individuals with conviction records
7, 73.4% versus 63.7%
8, and 
the difference is statistically significant according to the t-test. Against 
expectations, the observed wages are higher among individuals with 
conviction records than among individuals without convictions (1.85 versus 
1.79, meaning 6.35 pounds per hour versus 6 pounds per hour) even though 
the difference is not significant in statistical sense (p-value is about 12%). 
However, as discrimination analysis below seems to indicate, such advantage 
                                                 
7 Convicted individuals are more likely to be self-employed (17.4% vs. 12.2%), unemployed 
(4.8% vs. 2%) and inactive (14.1% vs. 12.4%) than non-convicted, confirming the greater 
difficulties of integration into labour market due to conviction records. 
8 The full sample shows a greater differential: 72.7% versus 61.1%.   13
may simply indicate a stronger selection of convicted with “good” 
characteristics into employment and relegation into self-employment or 
inactivity of convicted with “bad” characteristics, justifying a push-up effect 




Empirical results are based on cross-sectional data models. Tables 3 and 4 
present the results of the employment analysis, while tables 5, 6 and 7 present 
the results of the wage analysis. Since we are interested in discrimination 
analysis, employment and wage equations are estimated separately for each 
group: convicted and non-convicted individuals. We first comment on the 
employment analysis, and then we focus on the wage analysis. Employment 
equations are estimated by applying probit models and controlling for 
individual, familiar, job-related and local-specific characteristics to account 
for observable heterogeneity.  
 
Table 3 Employment equation estimates 
b s.e. P-value % Effect b s.e. P-value % Effect
Male -0.015 0.032 0.643 -1.5% 0.134 0.193 0.488 14.3%
Educational level 0.029 0.010 0.004 2.9% 0.097 0.048 0.046 10.2%
Ethnic -0.096 0.115 0.403 -9.2% 0.399 0.482 0.407 49.0%
Disability -0.257 0.102 0.012 -22.6% 0.150 0.443 0.734 16.2%
Poor health -1.238 0.082 0.000 -71.0% -0.962 0.298 0.001 -61.8%
Drug use -0.182 0.031 0.000 -16.7% -0.341 0.135 0.012 -28.9%
Married -0.068 0.047 0.145 -6.6% 0.095 0.182 0.602 9.9%
Children 0-6 -0.543 0.049 0.000 -41.9% -1.175 0.458 0.010 -69.1%
Male*Children 0-6 0.543 0.069 0.000 72.2% 0.828 0.490 0.091 128.9%
Number of unemployment spells -0.095 0.038 0.013 -9.1% -0.112 0.111 0.315 -10.6%
Vocational 0.110 0.032 0.000 11.7% 0.126 0.144 0.382 13.4%
Computer use 0.430 0.031 0.000 53.8% 0.328 0.139 0.018 38.8%
Partner employed 0.299 0.039 0.000 34.9% 0.394 0.164 0.016 48.3%
North-east 0.184 0.064 0.004 20.2% 0.090 0.280 0.747 9.5%
Yorkshire-The Humber 0.142 0.054 0.008 15.3% -0.117 0.239 0.625 -11.1%
East midlands 0.153 0.059 0.009 16.6% 0.615 0.297 0.038 84.9%
East-anglia 0.086 0.074 0.246 9.0% 0.020 0.359 0.955 2.1%
South-west -0.076 0.051 0.133 -7.3% 0.025 0.259 0.922 2.6%
West-midlands 0.160 0.055 0.003 17.4% 0.023 0.247 0.925 2.3%
North-west 0.131 0.051 0.010 14.0% 0.140 0.268 0.602 15.0%
Wales -0.036 0.065 0.579 -3.5% -0.463 0.310 0.136 -37.0%
Scotland 0.115 0.054 0.033 12.2% 0.049 0.233 0.833 5.0%







0.0787 0.1465  
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
Emerging results are quite standard. As expected, educational level positively 
affects employment probabilities of both groups; interestingly the return is 
higher for convicted individuals even though the estimate is less significant in 
terms of p-value then the non-convicted case. Disability reduces the 
probability of employment only for non-convicted individuals. On the contrary   14
poor health status significantly affects the employment probabilities of both 
convicted and non-convicted individuals; however non-convicted individuals 
seem to suffer a greater penalty. Drug consumption (present or past) also 
reduces employment probabilities both of convicted and non-convicted 
individuals. Interestingly the negative effect is stronger for convicted 
individuals, possibly indicating that the association between conviction and 
drug use produces a worsening of the stigma against convicted individuals. 
Consistently with major studies regarding employment opportunities and child 
care, having children aged 0-6 strongly reduces employment probabilities for 
both groups, even though the effect is stronger among convicted individuals. 
On the one side, this suggests a weakness of the child-care system. On the 
other side, as expected, the presumed weakness of the child-care system 
appears to affect females rather than males. In fact, the estimation of the 
interaction dummy introduced to control that duality is indicative that males 
are not disadvantaged by having children aged 0-6. The number of spells of 
unemployment cumulated since the entry in the labour market is introduced to 
capture the effect of an interrupted career pattern that tends to reduce the 
accumulation of working experience. Have an increased number of 
unemployment spells reduces the probability of employment of non-convicted 
people. The estimate is not significant for convicted people, possibly because 
having previous conviction periods include the possibility of career pattern 
interruption, hence the specific effect of our control variable may be 
ineffective from the firms’ point of view. Vocational training appears to 
increase employment probabilities, meaning that specialization in working 
abilities is appreciated by employers. The covariate is not significant for 
convicted individuals. Similarly to the previous control variable, acquaintance 
with a personal computer increases employment probabilities in a labour 
market characterized by increasing use of new technologies. An employed 
partner employed also increases the probability of employment. It means that 
the substitution effect is deactivated while, as specific literature suggests, it is 
likely that a coupling effect is working, i.e. it is more likely to observe 
partnership between individuals with similar characteristics (for example 
education) favouring the employment probabilities of both or conversely. 
Finally regional dummies are introduced to control for local labour market 
effects. The South-East (that includes London) is the reference category. 
According to our estimates among non-convicted individuals, employment 
probabilities are higher in Northern regions, including Scotland, and in 
Midlands regions rather than in the reference region, while the other regions 
do not present significant estimates. Among convicted individuals only East 
Midlands present a significant, and strongly positive, effect with respect to the 
South-East, while other regions do not show significant differences.  
Table 4 presents evidence from the Fairlie (2005) decomposition, which 
allows decomposition analysis for non linear outcomes. Employment rate 
among non-convicted is about 10% greater than among convicted individuals 
(73.4% against 63.7%). The Fairlie decomposition clarifies that only 4.75% of   15
that differential (corresponding to 48.9% of the total differential) may be 
explained in terms of endowments, while the remaining 4.96% (51.1% of the 
total differential) is unexplained, i.e. attributable to differences in returns (and 
unobservables). Evidence of discrimination against convicted individuals in 
terms of employment, is indicative that firms take into account the expected 
extra-costs of hiring convicted workers. Moreover, according to our model 
predictions, because of partial adverse selection, part of that discrimination 
actually is an over-stigma against convicted individuals to recover expected 
extra-costs of unobservable offenders.  
 
Table 4 Fairlie Decomposition 
Differential
Non-convicted Convicted Absolute % Absolute %
0,7343 0,6372 0,0971 0,0475 48,91% 0,0496 51,09%
Observed Explained Unexplained
 
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
Table 5 reports wage equations estimation by adopting various liner 
models. Specifically, in turn, an OLS model, a Heckman (1979) model and a 
2SLS model with selectivity correction are used to estimate the effect of 
observable variables on the dependent variable, i.e. the log of hourly wage. 
Specifically, the first two columns regard the OLS estimates; third and fourth 
columns regard Heckman model estimates, which correct OLS estimates for 
sample selection, and finally the fifth column presents estimation results using 
a 2SLS model with selectivity correction, that allows me to correct the 



















                                                 
9 Table 6 also reports Sargan and Bausmann overidentification tests about the adequacy of 
used instruments.   16
Table 5 Wage equations estimates 
bs . e . P - v a l u e bs . e . P - v a l u e bs . e . P - v a l u e bs . e . P - v a l u e bs . e . P - v a l u e
Male 0.209 0.015 0.000 0.139 0.111 0.213 0.210 0.015 0.000 0.146 0.105 0.165 0.179 0.018 0.000
Educational level 0.067 0.005 0.000 0.068 0.027 0.011 0.067 0.005 0.000 0.073 0.027 0.008 0.156 0.014 0.000
Ethnic 0.037 0.050 0.457 0.052 0.210 0.805 0.035 0.050 0.487 0.072 0.202 0.724 0.056 0.076 0.462
Disability -0.016 0.050 0.747 -0.517 0.245 0.036 -0.021 0.051 0.673 -0.508 0.230 0.027 0.015 0.059 0.796
Poor health -0.023 0.056 0.688 -0.481 0.261 0.067 -0.049 0.075 0.512 -0.547 0.294 0.062 -0.040 0.092 0.658
Drug use 0.026 0.013 0.043 0.028 0.072 0.698 0.023 0.014 0.113 0.008 0.083 0.919 0.014 0.018 0.439
Married 0.037 0.016 0.017 0.066 0.080 0.412 0.039 0.016 0.015 0.076 0.079 0.337 0.042 0.020 0.032
Permanent contract 0.038 0.028 0.173 -0.100 0.183 0.586 0.038 0.028 0.172 -0.098 0.170 0.564 0.078 0.033 0.017
Private sector -0.023 0.014 0.093 0.233 0.098 0.019 -0.024 0.014 0.090 0.233 0.091 0.011 0.032 0.018 0.073
Non manual -0.173 0.018 0.000 -0.059 0.130 0.652 -0.173 0.018 0.000 -0.055 0.121 0.650 -0.150 0.022 0.000
Junior non manual -0.312 0.019 0.000 -0.303 0.169 0.075 -0.312 0.019 0.000 -0.299 0.158 0.058 -0.226 0.025 0.000
Skilled manual -0.311 0.020 0.000 -0.285 0.099 0.004 -0.311 0.020 0.000 -0.286 0.092 0.002 -0.201 0.029 0.000
Semi-skilled manual -0.399 0.027 0.000 -0.254 0.144 0.079 -0.399 0.027 0.000 -0.253 0.133 0.057 -0.245 0.039 0.000
Unskilled/Personal/Agricultural -0.590 0.025 0.000 -0.422 0.159 0.009 -0.590 0.025 0.000 -0.418 0.148 0.005 -0.444 0.036 0.000
Tenure 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.309 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.302 0.003 0.001 0.001
Number of unemployment spells -0.077 0.018 0.000 -0.062 0.076 0.419 -0.078 0.018 0.000 -0.071 0.075 0.342 -0.065 0.022 0.003
Firm size 1-9 -0.207 0.021 0.000 -0.003 0.137 0.982 -0.207 0.020 0.000 -0.004 0.128 0.976 -0.173 0.025 0.000
Firm size 10-24 -0.087 0.020 0.000 0.046 0.131 0.723 -0.087 0.020 0.000 0.047 0.122 0.699 -0.067 0.024 0.005
Firm size 25-99 -0.077 0.018 0.000 0.084 0.111 0.449 -0.076 0.018 0.000 0.084 0.104 0.415 -0.054 0.021 0.010
Firm size 100-499 -0.055 0.018 0.002 0.029 0.111 0.792 -0.055 0.018 0.002 0.027 0.104 0.792 -0.050 0.022 0.021
Part-time -0.105 0.017 0.000 -0.032 0.157 0.841 -0.106 0.017 0.000 -0.037 0.146 0.803 -0.126 0.021 0.000
Vocation -0.047 0.013 0.000 -0.197 0.074 0.009 -0.045 0.013 0.000 -0.189 0.072 0.009 -0.018 0.016 0.246
Union 0.031 0.014 0.027 0.109 0.084 0.192 0.031 0.014 0.027 0.110 0.078 0.158 0.004 0.017 0.830
Computer ability 0.129 0.014 0.000 0.111 0.082 0.177 0.137 0.020 0.000 0.124 0.083 0.137 0.107 0.024 0.000
Ability learn new skills 0.037 0.012 0.002 0.068 0.074 0.359 0.037 0.012 0.002 0.069 0.068 0.314 0.001 0.015 0.942
North-east -0.197 0.025 0.000 -0.109 0.142 0.444 -0.194 0.026 0.000 -0.104 0.134 0.435 -0.192 0.031 0.000
Yorkshire-The Humber -0.139 0.022 0.000 -0.137 0.138 0.320 -0.136 0.022 0.000 -0.149 0.132 0.260 -0.113 0.026 0.000
East midlands -0.104 0.023 0.000 -0.096 0.127 0.452 -0.102 0.024 0.000 -0.071 0.134 0.596 -0.084 0.029 0.004
East-anglia -0.074 0.030 0.015 -0.444 0.195 0.024 -0.072 0.030 0.017 -0.442 0.183 0.015 -0.068 0.036 0.060
South-west -0.138 0.022 0.000 -0.229 0.136 0.093 -0.139 0.022 0.000 -0.230 0.127 0.070 -0.131 0.026 0.000
West-midlands -0.106 0.022 0.000 -0.200 0.128 0.120 -0.103 0.022 0.000 -0.195 0.120 0.105 -0.116 0.026 0.000
North-west -0.167 0.021 0.000 -0.306 0.129 0.019 -0.165 0.021 0.000 -0.299 0.122 0.014 -0.144 0.026 0.000
Wales -0.206 0.028 0.000 -0.227 0.195 0.246 -0.206 0.028 0.000 -0.249 0.190 0.191 -0.185 0.033 0.000
Scotland -0.088 0.022 0.000 -0.160 0.122 0.192 -0.085 0.022 0.000 -0.163 0.114 0.154 -0.097 0.026 0.000
Lambda - - - - - - 0.036 0.067 0.594 0.098 0.245 0.689 0.070 0.083 0.399
Intercept 1.752 0.043 0.000 1.585 0.256 0.000 1.729 0.061 0.000 1.508 0.307 0.000 1.376 0.093 0.000
Rho - - - - - - 0.075 0.197 - - -
Observations
Censored obs - - - - - - - - -
Uncensored obs - - - - - - - - -
R2 -- - -- -
Adjusted R2 - - - - - -
F statistics - - - - - -
W a l d  C h i 2 -- - -- - -- -
86.4
















Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
The 2SLS is only used to estimate the wage equation of non-convicted 
individuals, since according to the Wu-Hausman F test and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Chi2 test education is not endogenous in the wage equation of 
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Table 6 Tests 
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value
Wu-Hausman F test F(1,5092) 55.423 0.000 F(1,154) 0.357 0.551
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi2 test Chi2(1) 55.225 0.000 Chi2(1) 0.441 0.507
Statistics P-value Statistics P-value
Sargan N*R2 test Chi2(5) 7.022 0.219 Chi2(5) 8.503 0.131
Basmann test Chi2(5) 6.975 0.223 Chi2(5) 6.989 0.222
NON-CONVICTED CONVICTED
Tests of endogeneity 
Tests of overidentifying
 
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
However, while all estimation results are presented, for brevity, we only 
comment on the results in the last two columns. On the one side, we control 
for the same variables used in the employment equation, except dummies 
regarding the presence of children aged 0-6 and the presence of employed 
partners, since they are expected not to affect wage equations. On the other 
side, we control for numerous job-related characteristics extremely relevant to 
determine wage variability across individuals. Evidence of gender duality 
against women is only found for non-convicted individuals, while among 
convicted individuals there are no significant differences in terms of gender. 
As expected, higher educational level increases wages both for convicted and 
non-convicted individuals. However, contrarily to the employment equation, 
education presents a stronger positive effect on wage of non-convicted rather 
than on wage of convicted individuals. Similarly, while disability does not 
affect the employment probabilities of convicted individuals, it strongly 
reduces their wages. This strong disadvantage may be partly explained by 
selection of disabled people into poor job positions. Poor health status also 
negatively affects wages of convicted individuals, while it does not produce 
significant effects on wages of non-convicted individuals. To be married also 
increases the wage of non-convicted workers. Job related characteristics 
largely explain wage variability, above all among the non-convicted. To be 
permanently employed increases the wages of non-convicted individuals, 
being employed in the private sector appears to increase the wage of both 
groups of individuals. Professional level, defined according to socio-economic 
group, importantly contributes to wage variability. The reference category is 
represented by manager and professional; with respect to this group a non-
manual profession slightly decreases wages, while a junior non-manual as well 
as a skilled or semi-skilled manual profession reduces the wage. Unskilled 
workers and workers employed in personal services or agriculture stay at the 
bottom of the wage distribution, without relevant difference between 
convicted and non-convicted. Tenure and number of unemployment spells 
only significantly affect the wage of non-convicted and both show the 
expected sign, positive and negative, respectively. Moreover, wages increase 
as firm size also increases. Estimation results are significant for non-
convicted. Similarly part-time reduces the hourly wage of the non-convicted,   18
consistently with most of the literature that identifies part-time jobs as a source 
of segregation in the labour market. Unexpectedly, vocational training reduces 
the wage of convicted individuals. While union membership does not affect 
significantly the wage of individuals, good computer skills, as expected, 
increases the wage of non-convicted. The variable controlling for the ability in 
learning new skills, introduced to proxy the ability of workers as a source of 
endogeneity and/or selection effect, is not significant either for convicted or 
for non-convicted individuals. Wages diverge across regions. Employment 
probabilities are higher in northern regions, while wages are lower. South-East 
(including London) is the region where jobs are better paid, while convicted 
individuals appear to be particularly disadvantaged in East-Anglia. Finally, the 
inverse Mills’ ratio (lambda) introduced to correct for selectivity is not 
significant. This implies that even though selection into non employment of 
convicted individuals exists, it seems not to be affecting the wage equation of 
either group.  
Table 7 gives the decomposition of predicted wage among endowment, 
coefficients (returns) and interaction effects, or between explained and 
unexplained components. Differential due to selection effect is also accounted 
for. While in the table 7 we present all results from discrimination analysis, for 
brevity and since results are consistent across econometric models used, we 
only comment on the results derived from the estimation reported in columns 
4 (IV model for non-convicted) and 5 (Heckman model for convicted 
individuals) of the table 5. 
 
Table 7 Decomposition analysis for wage equations 
Mean prediction wNC 1.791 1.776 1.762
Mean prediction wC 1.850 1.799 1.799
Raw differential (R) -0.059 -0.024 -0.037
Due to endowments (E) -0.077 -0.074 -0.073
Due to coefficients (C) 0.031 0.065 0.041
Due to interaction (CE) -0.013 -0.015 -0.005
Weighting matrix 0 1 0.5 0.964 0 1 0.5 0.964 0 1 0.5 0.964
Unexplained (U){C+(1-D)CE} 0.018 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.051 0.065 0.058 0.065 0.035 0.041 0.038 0.041
Explained (V) {E+D*CE} -0.077 -0.090 -0.084 -0.090 -0.074 -0.089 -0.081 -0.088 -0.073 -0.078 -0.076 -0.078
% unexplained {U/R} -30.7 -52.9 -41.8 -52.1 -215.3 -277.6 -246.4 -275.3 -94.5 -108.8 -101.6 -108.1
% explained (V/R) 130.7 152.9 141.8 152.1 315.3 377.6 346.4 375.3 194.5 208.8 201.6 208.1
Differential due to selection -0.035 -0.021
OLS estimates Heckman estimates IV (non-convicted)-Heckman estimates
 
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
According to the estimated models the raw differential is 0.037 in favour of 
convicted individuals, confirming evidence from observed values. Differently 
from the OLS estimates, measuring a raw differential equal to 0.059 in favour 
of convicted individuals, models controlling for selectivity reveal that part of 
the differential favourable to convicted is due to selection into employment. In 
other words, part of the measured advantage (equal 0.022) is explained by the 
selection of convicted individuals (with better characteristics) into 
employment. Alternatively, this may be seen as a consequence of selection   19
into self-employment or inactivity of convicted people with poor 
characteristics. Moreover, while the raw differential, net of selection effect, is 
0.037 in favour of convicted, according to observable variables the differential 
in favour of convicted should be higher and equal to 0.073. This means that 
what is observed as an advantage for convicted individuals actually is a 
disadvantage. In fact, the coefficients (or returns) effect is favourable to non-
convicted individuals (0.041), indicating that for the same level of 
characteristics, the wage of a convicted worker is lower. Translating into non-
logarithm terms, the discrimination corresponds to 25 cents per worked hour, 
which is almost 500 pounds per year. Wage decomposition results are 
consistent across weighting matrix used, and differences appear to be quite 
negligible. Resuming, results from wage discrimination analysis confirm that 
convicted individuals may be disadvantaged in terms of wage with respect to 
non-convicted for reasons other than the penalty arising from expected lower 
productivity. The existence of wage discrimination, may be seen as a 
consequence of firms’ needs to absorb expected extra-costs. Otherwise, the 
returns effect should be null, i.e. the only wage differential should be 
attributable to endowments or selection effects. This finding suggests that in 
determining wages, firms take into account the expected extra-costs. Above 
all, if the probability of conviction is less than one and firms act rationally, 
wage discrimination against convicted individuals is greater that the “fair 
amount” since it also includes the recovery of expected extra-costs of 
unobservable offenders. This implies that the disadvantage on the labour 
market for convicted individuals is larger than what is possible to expect from 
conviction. Finally, the existence of wage discrimination combined with 
employment discrimination is possibly suggesting that the cost of inefficiency 
level is not fully recoverable by applying only wage discrimination without 




This paper focuses on the poorer performance of convicted people in terms of 
labour market outcomes. On the basis of the 6
th sweep of the NCDS data, we 
found that the observed employment rate is lower among convicted 
individuals, while the observed wage is higher. Nevertheless, the latter 
evidence is largely explained by exclusion from employment of convicted 
individuals with worse characteristics, who are more likely to be self-
employed or inactive. Analysis based on decomposition techniques applied to 
static employment and wage equations, shows that actually convicted 
individuals are discriminated against on the labour market both in terms of 
employment and wage. On the basis of a simple model and under the 
assumption of firms’ rationality, we suggest that discrimination against 
convicted individuals derives from two sources. The first is an “expected” 
discrimination, which derives from reasons directly imputable to convicted 
individuals. The second is an “unexpected” discrimination, which derives from   20
the inefficiency of the police/justice system that implies partial adverse 
selection in the hiring process. Discrimination proves two main facts. First, 
firms expect extra-costs from hiring offenders, since they are more likely to 
offend in the future, and the reduction in the characteristics’ return is applied 
to reduce employment and wage level to endogenize the loss deriving from the 
extra-costs (economic stigma). Second, because of the inefficiency of the 
police/justice system, some offenders are unobservable and a partial adverse 
selection problem arises in the hiring process. The deriving cost of 
inefficiency of the police/justice system is loaded on convicted individuals, if 
firms act rationally, worsening their labour market outcomes (over-stigma). 
The over-stigma is increasing in the extra-costs and in the proportion of the 
population offending and is decreasing in the probability of convicting 
offenders, and its magnitude may be seen as a measure of inefficiency of 
police/justice system. 
The main implication of our results is that, with partial adverse selection, 
convicted individuals face greater disadvantage in the labour market with 
respect to the expected stigma deriving from worse job-related characteristics 
affecting productivity and from the existence of extra-costs connected to the 
risk of recidivism. This may have implications also in terms of dynamic 
offending decision framework. 
While the paper brings to light new evidence and proposes new lines of 
investigation about the performance of convicted individuals in the labour 
market, much remains to be done. For example, since panel data are not 
available for the purpose of our paper, unobservable heterogeneity is not 
accounted for. Moreover, in the context of identification of discrimination 
sources, would be a relevant issue to investigate and the study of the 
relationship between the magnitude of over-stigma and conviction rates of 




In the context of my analysis, a selection effect (different from selection bias 
and endogeneity) may occur if unobserved factors are correlated with both the 
treatment (conviction) and the outcome (wage and, overall, employment). 
Since cross-sectional data do not allow to model unobservable heterogeneity a 
possible source of estimation bias remains uncontrolled, for even though a 
large number of explanatory variables is used to reduce the unobservable 
variability. In any case, different methods are available to correct cross-
sectional data estimates in case of selection effect or, at least, to test the 
presence and the relevance of unobservable factors selecting individuals both 
into treatment and outcome equations. Possibly, applying a bivariate probit 
model is one of the best solution to solve the problem of employment 
equation. However, since I need to estimate separately an employment 
equation for each group, the bivariate probit model cannot be used to correct 
estimates. On the contrary, it remains a valid instrument to test the presence   21
and the relevance of unobservable factors potentially affecting employment 
and conviction probabilities. Since this approach assumes that unobserved 
factors manifest themselves in the correlation of the errors of both equations, I 
am only interested in the magnitude and the significance of the correlation 
term (Rho). Employment probability is explained in terms of the variables 
presented above, while conviction probability is explained in terms of 
numerous variables including childhood and adolescence background, and past 
trouble with the police
10.  
 
Table A1 Biprobit estimates: correlation between error terms 
Likelihood-ratio test of Rho=0
Rho Chi2(1) Prob > Chi2
-0.066 3.642 0.056  
Source: my elaboration on sixth sweep of NCDS data 
 
Estimation of the correlation term indicates that, while the presence of 
unobserved factors affecting both events cannot be excluded, it should be 
rather small and significant only at 10%, possibly reducing suspects of 

























                                                 
10 The list of explanatory variables used and the estimation results are available upon request.   22
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